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 This article explores economic diplomacy between the United States and Great Britain in 
South America during the Second World War. The dominant theme presented in the existing 
relevant literature on this subject is one whereby the US promoted a multilateral economic 
system, based on equal access to markets and resources, against the opposition of a British 
government determined to protect a closed trading system. The situation that arose in South 
America was markedly different. It was Britain that promoted multilateralism in South 
America, based on the belief that such a system would provide the surest means of protecting 
its interests in this region. The US, on the other hand, prioritised security concerns and short-
term economic gains over the promotion of a multilateral trading system in its policy towards 
South America. In exploring this alternative situation that arose in South America this article 
represents a challenge to traditional conceptions of Anglo-American economic diplomacy 
during World War II.  
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Amidst the joint military operations, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic exchanges and 
close personal relationships that constituted the Anglo-American alliance of the Second 
World War, the United States and Great Britain also sought to reach agreement over the 
nature of the global economic system that would take shape once the war was over.  The 
Great Depression of the 1930s had crippled the global economy, with world trade shrinking 
to a third of its 1928 level by the summer of 1932 and recovering only haltingly in 
subsequent years.1  The outbreak of world war in the 1940s wholly dislocated the norms of 
international trade and finance and left uncertain the politico-economic structures that would 
be left in its wake.  
In this sense the war also represented something of an opportunity for the United 
States - as the pre-eminent rising international power of the time - to shape the political 
economy of the post-war world.2  In seeking to do this diplomacy with Britain during the war 
was of paramount importance.  Although by this time a declining power, London was still the 
centre of the financial world and British traders retained a firm grip on large amounts of 
international trade by the early 1940s.  The Anglo-American wartime alliance was thus the 
principal forum in which post-war economic diplomacy took place.  This took the form of 
high-level negotiations concerning the economic governance structures to be instituted in the 
post-war years.  Similarly, there was ongoing localised rivalry between private interests and 
official representatives of the two nations in regions anticipated to be of particular 
significance to the future commercial prospects of either country.  
One such region that fell within this latter category was South America.  Throughout 
the nineteenth century Britain dominated South American commerce, securing important 
export markets, establishing itself as the chief customer for many of the region’s primary raw 
materials and investing heavily in public utilities like telecommunications and railways.3  By 
the turn of the twentieth century British domination of South America was increasingly 
challenged by the US, as the country made significant commercial inroads in Brazil and 
established important strategic interests in the region.4  The US increased its presence in 
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South America during the First World War, exploiting opportunities created by the conflict to 
replace European exports to the region with its own.5  Moreover, in the decade that followed, 
US private interests, with the backing of their government, successfully challenged Britain’s 
predominance in banking and capital investment in the region.6  The tide continued to turn in 
favour of the US in the depression-laden 1930s, as inter-American trade was consolidated in 
order to make up for the loss of European markets, whereas Britain sacrificed much of its 
presence in South America in favour of Empire trade.7  
Thus, by the outbreak of the Second World War the US had replaced Britain as the 
dominant foreign economic power in South America.  Nevertheless, Britain still retained 
substantial interests in the region, particularly in Argentina.  South America remained, 
therefore, of substantial commercial interest to both the US and Britain by the outbreak of 
World War II.  Moreover, as this article will demonstrate, the economic diplomacy that 
transpired between the two powers concerning South America differed markedly from that 
regarding other parts of the world and in more general negotiations.  As such, this article 
makes the case that exploring the situation that unfolded in South America makes a valuable 
contribution to broader debates on Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second 
World War.  
 
The historiography of Anglo-American economic diplomacy 
 
Just as he had dominated much of the war itself, the early literature on the Anglo-American 
wartime alliance was written in the shadow of Winston Churchill’s six volume history of the 
conflict, published in the late 1940s and early 1950s.8  Conscious to avoid publication of 
anything that could damage the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ that he had laboured 
so hard to construct during the war, Churchill intentionally omitted issues from his history 
which had in fact caused tensions and rivalries between the two countries.9  Contentious 
issues such as economic diplomacy were therefore largely absent from Churchill’s work and 
the studies written in its wake.10  
This silence was only broken in 1956 with the publication of Richard Gardner’s study 
of Anglo-American negotiations concerning the post-war global economy, Sterling-Dollar 
Diplomacy.  At the centre of Gardner’s book was the attempt to implement a multilateral 
trading system for the post-war era.  Based on the principles of equality of access to the 
world’s markets and raw materials, free convertibility of currency and a general stabilisation 
of exchange rates, the ambition was that this system would replace the protectionist structures 
developed by nations during the inter-war period.11  Foremost among these was the imperial 
preference system and sterling area operated throughout the British Empire.  Created at the 
Ottawa conference of 1932, imperial preference granted preferential tariffs for countries 
within the British Empire and therefore discriminated against outside countries, such as the 
United States.12  Similarly, the sterling area pegged the currencies of Empire countries to the 
pound and tied up their export earnings in sterling loans lodged in London.13  Proclaimed as 
an Anglo-American war aim in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, reaffirmed in the Master Lend-
Lease agreement of the following year and ratified in the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, 
the attempt to institute a multilateral trade system was indeed the dominant feature of Anglo-
American economic diplomacy during the war.14  
The motivation behind multilateralism, according to its chief advocate, US Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull, went way beyond the realm of commerce.  Rather, Hull and his 
internationalist followers in the State Department believed that the barriers to international 
trade erected in the past had laid the foundations for political rivalries, resulting eventually in 
war.  Once these trade barriers were removed, Hull believed, commercial interactions 
between nations would increase, resulting in friendly political relations.  Moreover, Hull 
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believed that the freer trade achieved by nations in a multilateral system would lead to greater 
prosperity for all.  Such prosperity, so the argument went, would eliminate the need for 
nations to embark upon the kind of economic warfare that eventually led to the use of force.  
Thus, economic planning for the post-war world was being put to the service of a broader 
scheme to secure lasting peace and stability on a worldwide basis.15  
But while Gardner’s book certainly broke new ground by introducing economic 
diplomacy to the historiography of Anglo-American relations during World War II, it 
simultaneously reinforced Churchill’s image of amity between the two nations by depicting 
efforts to construct a multilateral system for the post-war era as a collaborative effort serving 
the interests of both countries.  This characterisation was only challenged with the emergence 
of revisionist scholars in the 1960s.  
In the first major revisionist work, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William 
Appleman Williams fully accepted that the central aim of US economic diplomacy in the 
Second World War was to institute a multilateral system that would facilitate greater access 
to markets and resources.  But, Williams crucially pointed out that such a system would, by 
way of the country’s anticipated economic superiority by the end of the Second World War, 
principally act to guarantee US access above that of all others.  Williams’ central thesis was 
that US business and political leaders in the twentieth century came to believe that an 
essential prerequisite for the country’s economic and political well-being was a need to 
continually expand foreign markets.  Instituting a multilateral global trading system for the 
post-World War II era would achieve this goal by ensuring an ‘open door’ for US economic 
expansion.16  In the revisionist thesis, then, it was US domestic prosperity, rather than a 
desire to create the economic conditions necessary for world peace, that constituted the 
principal motivation behind the attempt to institute multilateralism in the Second World War. 
Heavily influenced by Williams, Gabriel Kolko applied much the same open door 
thesis to his 1968 study of wartime diplomacy, The Politics of War.17  Lloyd C. Gardner 
adopted a similar thesis in his analysis of the Roosevelt administration, Economic Aspects of 
New Deal Diplomacy.18  In these works the general paradigm presented was one whereby the 
US economic system’s need for post-war markets and resources compelled the Roosevelt 
administration to employ multilateralism as a lever with which to prize open Britain’s 
imperial preference system.  Recognising the selfish motivations driving US policy, Britain 
baulked at this effort and tried to preserve the markets ensured under imperial preference and 
the sterling area, which the Churchill government believed would be so vital to the country in 
the post-war era.19   
This portrayal of Anglo-American rivalry over economic policy was further 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s in a number of works which benefited from the de-
classification of wartime documents that revealed a relationship that was generally much 
more competitive than had previously been represented.20  But while economic rivalry had by 
this time been firmly established as an integral component of the historiography of Anglo-
American relations during the war, the nature of that rivalry – whereby the US advocated 
multilateralism against British opposition – remained largely unquestioned.  
This changed with the publication in the late 1980s and early 1990s of works from 
both sides of the Atlantic which re-examined Anglo-American economic diplomacy. Randall 
B. Woods’ study, A Changing of the Guard, explored the inter-agency rivalry within the 
Roosevelt administration for control over economic policy.  While internationalists in the 
State Department and White House advocated multilateralism, a combination of bureaucratic 
imperialists within the Treasury, supported by Congressional conservatives serving special 
interests, wished to commit the country to a programme of economic nationalism.  The result, 
Woods argued, was the advocacy by the Roosevelt administration of a ‘modified 
multilateralism’, which sought the more limited goals of transferring financial power from 
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London to Washington and boosting US exports.21  Similarly, Alan Dobson’s study, US 
Wartime Aid to Britain, demonstrated that Britain’s ability to compete in a multilateral 
system in the post-war era was constrained by the US Treasury’s wartime policy of limiting 
British reserves.  Moreover, British officials were concerned over the timing of the reforms to 
the global economy being proposed by their US counterparts.  While the majority of British 
officials may have agreed with the policy of multilateralism, therefore, they disagreed with 
the US strategy of how to achieve such a goal.22   
But notwithstanding the important contributions of these studies, the dominant trend 
in the literature on Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second World War 
remains to emphasise the US commitment to multilateralism, alongside British resistance to 
this policy.23  This pattern is reinforced in the various works exploring Anglo-American 
rivalry concerning particular regions. The vast majority of these have focused on areas such 
as Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, which had traditionally been dominated 
by Britain - both through its official and ‘informal empire’ - and where the US previously 
lacked a substantial presence.24  In these regions it was only natural that diplomacy between 
the two countries would reflect the pattern of general negotiations, whereby the US promoted 
a multilateral system against British opposition. 
 
South America in the existing literature 
 
Similar studies of Anglo-American economic diplomacy concerning South America have, 
until recently, been studiously avoided.25  For some, this omission is a wholly correct 
reflection of the significance of the topic.  One of the few occasions that Anglo-American 
relations in South America has been discussed at any length is in a collection of essays 
exploring the role of Argentina in international politics during the Second World War years.  
This collection includes contributions by Alec Campbell and Warren Kimball, offering, 
respectively, a British and American perspective on the relationship between the wartime 
allies in Latin America.26  The unanimous conclusion reached in these pieces is that Anglo-
American relations in the region amounted to little of interest to historians.  
On the one hand, this argument is based upon the claim that officials in Washington 
and London did not pay enough attention to Latin America during the war to warrant 
historical enquiry into the topic.  But this conclusion is reached largely on the basis of the 
lack of reference to the region by Roosevelt and Churchill.  While it is certainly true that the 
wartime leaders did not pay significant attention to Latin America during the war, to 
disregard the significance of the region on this basis seems unwise.  In the case of Roosevelt, 
issues concerning Latin America were largely delegated to his trusted and influential friend 
Sumner Welles, the US Under Secretary of State.27  More broadly, neither Roosevelt nor 
Churchill had much interest in any matters during the war other than those directly related to 
the prosecution of the conflict.28  And while this was surely a sensible prioritisation of topics 
at the time, it certainly does not mean that the whole panoply of issues in Anglo-American 
relations considered at governmental levels below that of the executive was insignificant - 
particularly when these issues were part of broader changes in the international balance of 
power, as economic diplomacy between the two powers was. 
The second basis upon which Anglo-American relations in Latin America is 
discounted in these essays is on the grounds that there was sufficient acceptance among 
British officials that Latin America fell within Washington’s sphere of influence, and that this 
in turn prevented any real rivalry between the powers from taking place in the region.  It is 
certainly true that British officials recognised the US as the predominant external political 
influence in South America by the time of the Second World War.  But equally, there was a 
widespread determination throughout the British government to retain and, indeed, expand its 
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commercial interests in South America in the post-war era.29  As this article will go on to 
show, this determination led to continuous rivalry between the two powers throughout South 
America, and, moreover, high-level negotiations concerning the fate of British interests in the 
region in the broader context of Anglo-American relations.  
 
Anglo-American economic diplomacy in South America 
 
The negotiations between the US and Britain concerning South America differed markedly 
from those regarding other parts of the world and the more general diplomacy concerning the 
economic shape of the post-war world.  It was Britain that promoted multilateralism in its 
diplomacy with the US concerning South America.  Britain lacked the preferential position in 
South America that it sought to defend in other parts of the world.  A multilateral system 
based on equality of access to markets and raw materials therefore represented its best chance 
of holding on to its commercial interests in the region.  The Roosevelt administration, on the 
other hand, was divided concerning the appropriate attitude to be taken towards Britain in 
diplomacy concerning South America.  On the one hand there were those like the 
internationalists in the State Department who wished to promote multilateralism in South 
America in the service of bringing about such a system on a global scale in the post-war era.  
Others, however, like the State Department’s Latin Americanists and influential temporary 
government agencies, pursued policies that had the effect of excluding British interests from 
South America, and thereby denying Britain the export markets required for the country to 
participate in a multilateral system in the post-war era. 
Even prior to the US entry into the war in December 1941, groups within the country 
intent upon excluding British interests from South America factored in Anglo-American 
diplomacy concerning the region.  From September 1939 onwards members of the US 
business community and sections of the Roosevelt administration instinctively hostile 
towards Britain rallied around criticisms of British trade practices in the region.  Whether it 
related to British censorship in the Western Hemisphere, measures of economic warfare, or 
Britain’s export policy towards the region, the recurring theme of this criticism was that 
Britain was following policies ostensibly aimed at advancing the Allied war effort that in fact 
harmed US commercial interests in South America, while advancing Britain’s own.30  E. F. 
McDonald, a low-ranking official in the Roosevelt administration, spoke for many in the US 
when he expressed suspicion of British motives.  ‘Never for a minute’, stated McDonald, ‘no 
matter how dire the emergency, do the British fail to think of the ultimate future and their 
position’.31  
There was a keen desire within the British government to refute such claims.32  
However, as criticisms of British trade practices in South America became an increasingly 
prominent political issue in the US they were consequently viewed in London as a threat to 
winning the Roosevelt administration’s support for the British war effort.  London therefore 
took a variety of steps to pacify criticisms of British commercial activities in South America.  
These included adjusting censorship arrangements, aligning London’s blacklisting policies 
with Washington’s and finally, in September 1941, issuing the Export White Paper 
forbidding Britain from using materials received from the US under the Lend-Lease aid 
programme ‘in such a way as to enable their exporters to enter new markets or to extend their 
export trade at the expense of the United States’.33  Cumulatively, the effect of these 
measures was a contraction of British economic interests in South America, and in this sense 
an early success for those intent upon excluding British interests from the region.34 
Following Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent conversion of the US to a full belligerent 
in the global conflict, relations between the allies in South America improved.  More 
specifically, the two countries collaborated in blacklisting policy and took steps towards 
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coordinating the supply of essential goods to the region.35  However, such cooperation as 
existed was restrained throughout the first half of 1942, as British attempts to forge a 
collaborative partnership between the two countries in South America were continually 
hindered by unilateralist tendencies in the US.  As expressed in a State Department memo of 
April 1942, US joint policy with Britain towards South America should be premised on the 
basis that ‘the Western Hemisphere is our back yard and we are the ones, like it or not, who 
are going to play a principal role there’.36  This kind of attitude fuelled suspicions among 
British officials and businessmen that the true aim of their US counterparts was indeed to use 
opportunities afforded by the war to exclude British commercial interests from South 
America on a permanent basis.37  As Victor Perowne, head of the South American 
department of the Foreign Office put it, there was a clear tendency within the US that was 
‘determined to eliminate all alien influences (including our own) in Latin America’38 
Such anxieties on Britain’s part were a cause for concern to the State Department’s 
internationalists who feared that tensions between the two countries in South America could 
jeopardise efforts to win British cooperation in promoting a global multilateral trade system 
for the post-war era.39  This group therefore attempted to quell British fears by instructing US 
representatives in South America to promote multilateralism in all dealings with Britain in 
the region.  As Dean Acheson put it in a telegram to US representatives throughout the 
region, ‘the principle of non-discrimination and equality of treatment among nations’, which 
had been negotiated as part of the Master Lend-Lease agreement, should serve as the basis for 
all commercial dealings with the British in Latin America.40  Such a message was vital, 
believed fellow internationalist Selden Chapin, if the Roosevelt administration were to 
convince Britain that the US did not look upon Latin America ‘as a closed market for 
American goods’.41  These attempts at fostering cooperation between the wartime allies in 
Latin America began to bear fruit during the second half of 1942, as diplomats and 
businessmen from either country sought to put their differences aside in the name of the 
common war effort.42  Subsequently, there resulted in London a lessening of suspicions that 
the US was intent upon excluding British interests from the region.43  
However, throughout the autumn of 1942 and into the spring of 1943 it became clear 
that, notwithstanding the efforts of the internationalists to promote multilateralism in Latin 
America, there remained powerful forces within the Roosevelt administration which posed a 
direct challenge to this goal.  The most important of these was the State Department’s Latin 
Americanists.  Led by Sumner Welles, this group tended to take the lead in formulating 
policy towards the region and often did so without reference to broader geopolitical 
concerns.44  One of Welles’ principal aims for the post-war era was to promote an enhanced 
inter-American security system in the Western Hemisphere.45  However, Welles feared that 
European control over important industries and export markets in Latin America could 
provide European powers with the ability to disrupt such a system.  On the basis of this fear, 
Welles in January 1943 advised a British official that it was necessary for the US ‘to build up 
a position both in the political and economic fields which would enable them to occlude any 
such … activities’.  Such a policy would necessarily require US commercial dominance of 
the region, to the exclusion of significant British interests.46  
Similarly, temporary government agencies created for the wartime period, which 
often had close links to business in the US, sought to promote US commercial interests in 
South America.  For example, Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator for Inter-
American Affairs ensured the passing of tax legislation that gave US companies a preferential 
position in South America over their British competitors.47  In the same vein Eric Johnston, 
head of the Inter-American Development Commission, commented following a tour of Latin 
America in 1943 that whereas the last century in Latin America had been a ‘British Century’, 
the next would be an ‘American Century’.48  
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Collectively, these groups represented a parochial faction within the US, focused on 
Latin America, and largely impervious to how this region related to broader global issues of 
post-war planning.  While it may not always have been their intention, the policies pursued 
by these groups did in fact threaten to exclude British interests from South America.  As 
British officials observed these tendencies, any optimism that the previous efforts of the 
Roosevelt administration’s internationalists would protect British interests and engender 
cooperation between the two countries in Latin America soon evaporated.49  
With British fears of the country’s interests being excluded from South America 
firmly re-established by the spring of 1943, Whitehall departments embarked upon a lengthy 
reformulation of British policy towards Latin America.50  This took place against a backdrop 
of broader changes in the Anglo-American economic relationship, not least the advent of 
‘reverse Lend-Lease’ - the process whereby Britain supplied goods to the US.51  
Developments such as this, British ministers believed, allowed Britain to take a tougher 
stance in their negotiations with the US.  In the case of reformulating policy towards Latin 
America this attitude found voice in a meeting of the War Cabinet Lord President’s 
Committee on 21 May.  Here, President of the Board of Trade Hugh Dalton and Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden presented a memorandum pointing to the ‘urgent need of an 
approach to the United States Government . . . if this country is to stand any chance of 
regaining its Latin American markets after the war’.52  Subsequently, Lord Halifax, the 
British ambassador in Washington, met with Hull to discuss Anglo-American relations in 
Latin America in July of that year.   
The aide-memoire handed to Hull on this occasion tactfully articulated British fears in 
Latin America, describing ‘an impression, however false, that there may be some desire on 
the American side to supplant British traders in [their] established and traditional markets, not 
only for the war period, but permanently thereafter’.  In order to counteract this notion 
Halifax asked Hull if the US government would agree to what the Foreign Office termed a 
‘self-denying ordinance’ in Latin America - namely ‘the principle that no advantage in world 
markets shall accrue to either country at the expense of the other by reason of sacrifices made 
in the interest of the effective prosecution of the war’. 
Furthermore, in making its case to the Roosevelt administration, the British 
government framed its call for such restraint in the context of the multilateral trade 
programme, which had been continually advocated by the Roosevelt administration as the 
basis for the post-war economic order.  Specifically, the aide-memoire set out the argument 
that continued British access to the markets of South America - which a self-denying 
ordinance would be essential in preserving - must be a constituent part of an economic world 
order based on equal access to markets and resources.  Without access to such markets 
Britain would lack the necessary balance of payments to be able to participate in a 
multilateral system.  By linking the protection of British markets to the country’s ability to 
participate in the multilateral trade regime that the State Department’s internationalists were 
so attached to, Britain made a request that this group’s leader, Secretary of State Hull, could 
scarcely reject.  He subsequently denied that there was any intention on the part of the US to 
purge British interests from Latin America and pledged agreement to the principle of a self-
denying ordinance.53   
However, while Hull agreed to this principle in theory, the US government as a whole 
subsequently failed to adhere to it in practice.  This failure was due to a number of factors, 
including the bureaucratic nature of the US government, a lack of leadership on Latin 
American policy following the departure of Sumner Welles in September 1943, and a 
growing disillusionment among US officials with Britain’s activities in Latin America 
following disagreements over policy towards Argentina.54  But regardless of the reasons for 
the US failure to adhere to the self-denying ordinance pledged by Hull, the result was that 
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policies and programmes which had the effect of excluding British interests from South 
America were largely allowed to continue.  For example, when it came to implementing the 
Axis Replacement Programme in South America - whereby German and Italian concerns 
were eradicated from the region - there was little effort to prevent US companies from 
replacing them and thereby benefitting from wartime conditions.55  Similarly, in a case that 
had come to be seen as something of a litmus test for Anglo-American relations in South 
America, the Roosevelt administration failed to prevent a US company from gaining the 
contract for the electrification of the Central Brazilian railway, after it had been lost by a 
British firm due to supply shortages brought about by the war.56  Thus, the British attempt to 
institute a self-denying ordinance in Latin America - and thereby increase the likelihood of 
successfully implementing of a multilateral economic system for the post-war era - ultimately 




The fact that the British approach to the State Department concerning Latin America was 
considered at the highest levels of government in London, and, moreover, that the substance 
of the policy to be presented to the US had been the subject of so much debate between 
Whitehall departments over the previous months, demonstrates the error of previous studies 
in claiming that the region was of little or no importance to Britain, and therefore 
inconsequential to Anglo-American relations during the war.  In particular, the foregoing 
offers a comprehensive rebuttal of Alec Campbell’s claim that the British government had 
‘little disposition to try [to moderate US] policy in the Western Hemisphere’.57  More 
broadly, the rivalry that took place between the two nations in this region throughout the war 
has the effect of locating in South America, a further significant arena of rivalry between the 
US and Britain during the Second World War. 
The nature of the rivalry between the two nations in South America also means that 
research in this area can contribute to broader debates concerning Anglo-American economic 
diplomacy during the Second World War.  While the dominant trend in the literature remains 
to emphasise the US championing of multilateralism against British opposition, the situation 
that arose in South America was very different.  In this region it was Britain that emerged as 
the primary advocate of multilateralism and the US which, following internal struggles 
between different factions, failed to effectively promote a liberal trade agenda.  This 
demonstrates that Britain was by no means opposed in principle to the implementation of a 
multilateral trading system for the post-war era.  On the contrary, the British government 
wished to see such a system take shape, but equally recognised that for this to happen would 
require the US - as the emergent leading economic power in the world - to take active steps 
towards achieving this goal, such as ensuring that South American markets remained open to 
major trading nations like Britain in the post-war years.  
The fact that the US proved inadequate to this task is indicative of the limitations of 
the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to instituting a truly multilateral economic 
system for the post-war era.  Put simply, where it served both the economic self-interest and 
the broader political goals of the US to promote multilateralism - as it did in areas like the 
British Empire and the Middle East - the Roosevelt administration successfully advocated 
such a policy.  However, in a region like South America, where short-term economic interests 
and security concerns clashed with the broader goal of multilateralism, the US was unwilling 
to effectively promote this trading system.  In this sense the outcome of Anglo-American 
negotiations concerning South America supports the earlier conclusions of revisionists that it 
was naked self interest that constituted the fundamental motivation behind US economic 
diplomacy with Britain during the Second World War. Albeit in this case the methods used to 
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promote US interests were very different to those emphasised by the early revisionist 
scholars.  
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